Portugal Golden Visa Update

Portugal’s three largest parliamentary blocs filed competing amendment proposals on March 31, two days before the Assembly of the Republic reconsiders the nationality law decrees returned by the Constitutional Court in December.

The documents reveal deep disagreements on transitional protections for existing residents, the criminal threshold for blocking citizenship, and whether loss of nationality should survive as an accessory penalty.

All three proposals address Decree 17/XVII (the Nationality Law). Only Chega filed amendments to Decree 18/XVII (the Penal Code provision creating loss of nationality as a criminal penalty), raising questions about whether PSD and CDS-PP intend to reintroduce that measure through a separate filing before Wednesday’s session.

Residency Timelines: 6/9, 7/10, or Unchanged?

The sharpest divergence between the proposals concerns how long foreign residents must wait before applying for citizenship. PSD and CDS-PP, the governing coalition, leave the October 2025 parliamentary text’s seven-year timeline for European Union (EU) and Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) nationals, and ten years for all others, untouched in their amendment.

Those provisions appear as “[…]” in the PSD/CDS-PP text, meaning they carry forward without modification.

The Socialist Party (PS) proposes shorter timelines. Its version of Article 6(1)(b) requires that applicants have “resided legally in Portuguese territory for at least six years, in the case of nationals of Portuguese-speaking countries and citizens of EU Member States, or nine years, in the case of nationals of other countries.”

For Golden Visa holders, who are overwhelmingly non-EU and non-CPLP nationals, the difference between nine and ten years is operationally meaningful when compounded by processing delays that already push effective timelines to 12 to 14 years.

Chega’s filing does not amend the residency periods. Its proposal focuses exclusively on criminal bars, loss of nationality, and a new self-sufficiency requirement.

The Residency Clock, A Critical Divergence

The government’s original text revoked Article 15(4) of Law 37/81, the provision established by Law 2/2024 that counts residence time from the date an applicant submits a residency application rather than from when AIMA issues the permit. Given that AIMA routinely takes two to four years to process permits, this revocation would add years to the effective timeline without changing the headline number.

PSD/CDS-PP do not restore that provision. Their amendments drop what the Constitutional Court deemed an “innovative” interpretive norm in the temporal application clauses, and their explanatory note states that “requirements for access to nationality must be verified at the moment of the application.”

But that language refers to when eligibility criteria must be met, not to when residence counting begins. The revocation of Art 15(4) stands in the PSD/CDS-PP text, meaning the residency clock would start from permit issuance, not from application.

Only PS preserves the old counting method. Its Article 7(6) explicitly provides that “the previous wording of Article 15(4) of Law 37/81” applies to residence period calculations “until December 31, 2028,” giving current residents a three-year window to reach their thresholds under the application-date rule.

Monteiro, however, argued that the revocation may not be dispositive. “In my opinion, even with the removal of Article 15(4), there is margin to interpret the law in a way that the residency clock starts from the date of submission,” she said.

At minimum, she contended, the clock should begin “once the deadline that the public administration has to make the decision, which is currently 90 working days, expires, as long as it’s decided favourably.”

Interpreting the law otherwise “would put all the control on the public administration’s hands” and violate the constitutional principles of equality and human dignity, she argued, noting that two applications submitted on the same day could be approved on different dates through no fault of the applicants.

Transitional Protections: The Pivotal Divide

For the more than 20,000 Golden Visa investors awaiting AIMA appointments, the transitional provisions determine whether years of residency under the old five-year framework still count.

PSD/CDS-PP preserve protection for pending citizenship procedures (Article 7(2) remains “[…],” unchanged). But they eliminate the grandfathering window and graduated phase-in entirely, marking Article 7, paragraphs 3 and 4, as “Eliminated.” Residents who hold permits but have not yet filed for citizenship get nothing.

The PS proposal builds a layered transitional architecture. Pending administrative procedures follow the old law (Article 7(2)), and anyone meeting the old requirements at entry into force can file under the previous five-year rule until “31 de junho de 2026” (Article 7(3)), a date that does not exist and is likely a drafting error for June 30.

Beyond that grandfathering window, PS proposes graduated residency periods: six years for those who would have reached five years in 2026, seven for those reaching it in 2027, and eight for 2028 (Article 7(4)).

Madalena Monteiro, founder of Liberty Legal, who filed the Golden Visa investors’ amicus curiae brief to the Constitutional Court in December, characterized PSD’s amendments as “minor changes” that “address only the aspects ruled unconstitutional.”

PS, she observed, “is the only one presenting a proposal that tries to mitigate the drastic changes,” pointing to both the preservation of the application-date counting method through 2028 and the graduated phase-in.

The difference is stark. Under PSD/CDS-PP, a non-EU investor who moved to Portugal in 2022, expecting citizenship eligibility in 2027, would instead face a ten-year wait from the date of receiving the residence permit. Under the PS framework, that same investor would fall under the graduated seven-year transitional provision (Article 7(4)(b), covering those who would have reached five years in 2027), shaving three years off the PSD/CDS-PP timeline.

Criminal Impediment: Three Competing Thresholds

The Constitutional Court struck down the original text’s automatic denial of citizenship for criminal convictions exceeding two years, calling it a “disproportionate restriction” on the right to access nationality. All three parties responded with higher thresholds, but with a sharply different scope.

PSD/CDS-PP and PS converge on the same threshold and crime list. The PSD/CDS-PP text (Article 6(1)(f)) requires that applicants must “not have been convicted, with a final judicial decision, with an effective prison sentence exceeding five years for crimes of terrorism, violent crime, especially violent crime, highly organized crime, against the security of the State, or of aiding illegal immigration.” PS uses identical categories and the same five-year bar.

Where PSD/CDS-PP and PS diverge is on override mechanisms. Both create a judicial safety valve, but through different procedures. PSD/CDS-PP designate the criminal bar as a presunção ilidível (rebuttable presumption) assessed by the Public Prosecutor, weighing six enumerated factors:

• The concrete circumstances that objectively confirm or refute the existence of a bond of effective and genuine integration in the national community

• The sentence imposed

• The type of crime committed

• The intentional or negligent nature of the crime

• The time elapsed since the commission of the crime

• Possible recidivism

If the Prosecutor upholds the bar, the applicant may “bring judicial proceedings requesting the removal of that effect” (Article 6(15)).

PS frames the override differently. Article 6(14) allows the government to “grant naturalization whenever” the same set of factors “objectively demonstrate that the non-fulfillment of the requirement does not preclude the existence of a bond of effective integration of the applicant in the national community.”

The mechanism is executive rather than prosecutorial, placing the discretion with the government rather than channeling it through the Public Prosecutor’s office.

Chega breaks from both. Article 6(1)(f) bars citizenship for anyone sentenced to “imprisonment equal to or greater than three years, for any crime punishable under Portuguese law,” with no restriction to specific crime categories and no override mechanism.

The threshold formulation also differs technically: where PSD/CDS-PP and PS use superior a (exceeding, i.e., strictly more than five years), Chega uses igual ou superior a (equal to or greater than three years).

A fraud conviction, a financial crime, or any offense carrying a three-year sentence would permanently block citizenship under the Chega formulation.

Portugal Trams

Chega Adds, PS Deletes

The three proposals take opposite approaches to Article 6(1)(i). Chega replaces it with a self-sufficiency test requiring that applicants “possess the capacity to support themselves and not be recipients of social benefits during the period of residence.” PS marks the existing sub-paragraph for deletion (“ELIMINAR”). PSD/CDS-PP leave it unchanged.

For Golden Visa holders, Chega’s provision would pose no practical barrier. Its impact would fall on lower-income immigrants naturalizing through standard residency pathways.

Whether a blanket prohibition on receiving any social benefits during an entire residency period could survive constitutional scrutiny on equality grounds is an open question.

Defining “Rejection of National Community”

The court struck down the original provision allowing cancellation of nationality for “behaviors that conclusively and overtly reject adherence to the national community,” ruling that the language lacked sufficient precision. Both PSD/CDS-PP and PS attempt to fix this through different formulations.

PSD/CDS-PP retain the concept of assessing “lack of effective ties to the national community” under Article 9(1)(a), measured against the material parameters of Article 6(1)(c) through (i), “including the consideration of conviction for the crime of outrage against national symbols.” Revoked sub-paragraphs (b) and (d) narrow the grounds from the original text.

PS adds affirmative language, requiring “the demonstration of behaviors that, conclusively and ostensibly, reject adherence to the national community, its representative institutions and national symbols.” This formulation attempts to clear the court’s determinacy objection by specifying what conduct is captured, though critics may argue the phrase remains subjective.

Fraud Exception Narrowed

Both PSD/CDS-PP and PS amend Article 12-B(3) to block consolidation of nationality obtained fraudulently. PSD/CDS-PP tie the exception to Article 12-A’s existing definition, which covers nationality obtained “on the basis of false documents or documents certifying untrue or nonexistent facts, or through false declarations.”

The explanatory note specifies that “this exception to consolidation does not prejudice the access to nationality by third parties in good faith.”

PS uses slightly different language, blocking consolidation when nationality was obtained “in a manifestly fraudulent manner,” also with a good-faith carve-out. The word manifestamente (manifestly) sets a higher bar than the PSD/CDS-PP formulation, which references fraud under the general statutory definition.

Loss of Nationality, Chega Stands Alone

Only Chega filed amendments to Decree 18/XVII, the Penal Code provision creating loss of nationality as an accessory penalty. Its proposal sets the threshold at five years of effective imprisonment for crimes committed within 15 years of obtaining nationality.

Where PSD/CDS-PP reportedly narrowed the original crime list to aggravated homicide, slavery, human trafficking, rape, and sexual abuse (according to their explanatory statements reported by RTP, though their Decree 18 text was not among the documents obtained by IMI), Chega expands it.

Three new crime categories appear in Chega’s text: “criminal association, when the agent is the leader or director of the association” (Article 69-D(4)(h)); “arms trafficking and brokering” under the weapons law (Article 69-D(4)(i)); and “trafficking of narcotics or psychotropic substances” under the drug law (Article 69-D(4)(j)). These are precisely the offenses PSD/CDS-PP reportedly removed to address the court’s proportionality concerns.

On reacquisition of nationality after loss, Chega proposes tiered waiting periods: “between 15 and 25 years” for the most serious offenses and “between 10 and 15 years” for the remainder, both counted from the date the penalty becomes final.

Political Arithmetic

PSD parliamentary group vice-president António Rodrigues told RTP the proposals incorporate “contributions from all” parties they consulted, including PS, Chega, and party’s positions, calling PSD’s claim “false” and announcing independent proposals.

Adriano Vieira, a lawyer at Apparcel Uriarte Abogados, observed that the government “depends on the support of one of these two parties to secure a parliamentary majority,” with Chega pushing for “stricter and more restrictive measures” and PS favoring “longer transitional periods and shorter residency requirements.” Which direction prevails, he noted, could either “bring relief to Golden Visa applicants” or risk “undermining expectations and confidence among investors.”

The October 2025 vote passed 157 to 64, with PSD, CDS-PP, Chega, IL, and JPP in favor, and PS, Livre, PCP, BE, and PAN against.

What This Means for Golden Visa Holders

Portugal’s five-year citizenship pathway remains in force until a revised law is promulgated. PSD/CDS-PP protect only those who have already filed citizenship applications; everyone else faces the new timelines immediately. Only the PS text offers a grandfathering window, graduated phase-in, and preservation of the application-date counting method.

Permanent residency remains unaffected by all three proposals. After five years, Golden Visa holders can apply for permanent resident status regardless of changes to the citizenship timeline.Iniciativa Liberal (IL), and rejected suggestions of a PSD-Chega pact.